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I. 
 In some left political theory, democracy is an aspiration that occupies a place once held 
by communism. One might think of Chantal Mouffe’s and Ernesto Laclau’s work on radical 
democracy, accounts of deliberative democracy influenced by Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, or the pluralism espoused by William Connolly. These proper names, 
however, point to more than the specific proposals of specific theorists. They highlight a general 
underlying supposition that despite all our problems with democracy, democracy is the solution 
to all our problems. Whether expressed as the idea of an empty place where things can be 
otherwise or in terms of a set of procedures that incorporate already the keys to revising and 
reforming political practice, democracy, it seems, is our only political option.  As Margaret 
Thatcher said of capitalism, there is no alternative. For the left, democracy is our last, best hope. 
 Democracy, though, is inadequate as a language and frame for left political aspiration. 
Here are two reasons why; there are others. First, the right speaks the language of democracy. It 
voices its goals and aspirations in democratic terms. One of the reasons given for the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, for example, was the goal of bringing democracy to the Middle East. Similarly, 
leftists in the United States urge inclusion and participation, and so do those on the political 
right. The right complains about the exclusion of conservatives from the academy and God from 
politics. They, too, try to mobilize grass-root support and increase participation. There is nothing 
particularly left, then, about inclusion and participation. These are elements of democracy the 
right also supports. This rightwing adoption of democratic ideals prevents the left from 
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occupying the position of a political alternative to the right—if left positions are the same right 
ones then the left isn’t an alternative. Slavoj Zizek describes this situation where one’s enemy 
speaks one’s language as “victory in defeat” (2008, p. 189). When one's enemy accepts one's 
terms, one's point of critique and resistance is lost, subsumed.  The dimension of antagonism 
(fundamental opposition) vanishes.          
 A second reason democracy is inadequate as an expression of left aspiration is that 
contemporary democratic language employs and reinforces the rhetoric of capitalism: free 
choice, liberty, satisfaction, communication, connection, diversity. Like any media savvy 
corporation, democratic activists want to ensure that voices are heard and opinions registered. 
Corporations and activists alike are united in their preoccupation with awareness: people need to 
be aware of issues, of products, of products as signs of issues.  In this concrete sense, Zizek is 
right to claim that attachment to democracy is the form our attachment to capital takes (2002, p. 
273; 2008, p. 184). In the consumption and entertainment-driven setting of the contemporary 
United States, one’s commitments to capitalism are expressed as commitments to democracy.  
They are the same way of life, the same daily practices of “aware-ing” oneself and expressing 
one’s opinion, of choosing and voting and considering one’s choice a vote and one’s vote a 
choice.     
 More than inadequate as an expression of left political aspiration, democracy names left 
castration (“I know, but nevertheless”).  Because the left presents itself as appealing to and 
supporting democracy, it fails to take a stand, to name an enemy.  Instead of drawing a line and 
saying what it is against, what it excludes, left political theory in the contemporary United States 
advocates inclusion, universality, multiplicity, the plurality of modes of becoming, and ethical 
responsiveness.1 The dilemmas arising out of such advocacy have vexed left politics for some 
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time now as the politically correct encounter situations where inclusion comes up against its 
limits.  Politics embracing cultural diversity and progressive approaches to gender and sexuality 
do not fit easily together when what is taken to be a distinct culture rests on patriarchy or 
homophobia. Likewise, opposition to religious fundamentalism can rub up against secularizing 
projects of western imperialism. In such instances, an ideal of inclusivity is clearly inadequate: 
not every position is compatible with every other.        
 Left embrace of democracy denies democracy’s limits. It wants to hide itself from the 
ways democracy necessarily depends on and requires exclusion.  Insofar as left political theory 
adopts democracy as its primary aspiration, it disavows the fundamental antagonism 
conditioning politics as such. For the left (in the United States and in parts of the European 
Union), democracy thus takes the form of a fantasy of politics without politics (like fascism is a 
form of capitalism without capitalism): everyone and everything is included, respected, valued, 
and entitled.  No one is made to feel uncomfortable. Everyone is heard and seen and recognized 
and has a place at the table (George Lakoff identifies Barak Obama as a key figure in the new 
politics, which is precisely this “politics” of unity, empathy, and understanding).2   
 The criticisms of left embrace of democracy I raise here are part of a broadly shared 
frustration with and on the contemporary left. Indeed, left complaining or whining might even be 
the primary mode of left theorizing today.  We wallow in misery, in the deadlock in which we 
find ourselves. But whereas my emphasis is on democracy as the name of left deadlock, of the 
fantasy of politics without politics, others view the current problem as a crisis of de-
democratization (Wendy Brown) or de-politicization (Jacques Ranciere).  As Ranciere makes 
clear in his writings from the nineties , elements of the depoliticization thesis resonate with 
mainstream political discussions of the end of ideology, the rise of consensus politics, and even 
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the neoliberal withering away of the state, that is, the revisioning of the state as just another 
contractor of economic services—we were told that the era of big government was over. 
Financial crises that manifest themselves in the U.S. in 2008 and led to what the Bush 
administration presented as a necessary 700 billion dollar bailout of banks and institutions “too 
big to fail” quickly made this notion seem quaint and unconvincing. Nonetheless, the theme of 
depoliticization has been a pronounced one in the United States and Europe since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. It makes sense, then, to consider this theme more closely, interrogating its 
suppositions and their applicability in the contemporary setting. If the diagnosis of de-
democraticization and de-politicization is correct, then left politics should seek more democracy, 
should attempt re-politicization. But if I am right about the contemporary democratic deadlock, 
then a politics that reasserts democracy as the solution to all our problems will continue to entrap 
us in the same old circuits of defeat. It will fail, moreover, to attend to the politicizations already 
conditioning the current conjuncture.  
 In On the Shores of Politics (originally published in French in 1992; English translation 
published in 1995), Ranciere offers a version of the end of ideology thesis that affiliates this end 
with a kind of triumph of democracy (a triumph he criticizes). Democracy, Ranciere writes, is 
“no longer perceived as the object of a choice but lived as an ambient milieu, as the natural 
habitat of postmodern individuality, no longer imposing struggles and sacrifices in sharp 
contradiction with the pleasures of the egalitarian age” (22).  Such lived democracy is habitat 
rather than struggle; it is the setting in which we find ourselves rather a position requiring 
sacrifice and decision. As habitat, democracy is not itself political. Although this “becoming 
modest” of the state appears as a quintessentially modern adoption of the “same modes of 
management, communication, and consultation as the business enterprise” (106), 
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depoliticization, Ranciere argues, is actually the “oldest task of politics” (19).  Politics itself 
brings about depoliticization.  Indeed, “politics is the art of suppressing the political” (11). 
Ranciere’s arguments here are elegant and persuasive.  They result, however, in an analysis that 
hinders our ability to think clearly about the current conjuncture.  Ranciere accounts for the 
cause of depoliticization, politics itself, but he can’t explain the specificity of the present 
combination of neoliberalism and democracy as ambient milieu. Contemporary depoliticization, 
then, is but another appearance of the same old problem of politics. 
 In Disagreement (published in French in 1995; English 1999), Ranciere attends to some 
of these specificities.  He claims that “the state today legitimizes itself by declaring that politics 
is impossible” (110).  The present is thus marked by more than politics’ paradoxical essence—
the suppression of the political.  It is characterized by the explicit acknowledgement of 
depoliticization as the contemporary state’s legitimizing ideal.  Accordingly, Ranciere identifies 
several elements of contemporary post-politics as they confirm the impossibility of politics and 
hence legitimize the state: the spread of law, the generalization of expertise, and the practice of 
polling for opinion (112).  Polling, for example, renders the people as “identical to the sum of its 
parts” (105). “Their count is always even and with nothing left over,” he writes, “And this people 
absolutely equal to itself can always be broken down into its reality: its socioprofessional 
categories and its age brackets,” (105). It is worth nothing that Ranciere’s emphasis on law 
repeats the “juridification” thesis Habermas offered already in the nineteen eighties.  For 
Habermas, the problem was law’s encroachment on the lifeworld.  Excess regulation risked 
supplanting the communicative engagement of participants in socio-political interaction.  For 
Ranciere, the problem is a legal resolution of conflict that forecloses the possibility of 
politicization.         
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 The arguments for post-politics and de-democratization are at best unconvincing and at 
worst misleading to a left seeking to undo thirty years of neoliberalization.  The claim that we are 
in a post-political time, that politics has been foreclosed, excluded, prevented from emerging, is 
childishly petulant. It’s like the left is saying, “if we don’t get to play what we want, we’re not 
going to play.” The failure of left politics to win, or even score, is equated with a failure of 
politics as such, rather than acknowledged in the specificity of left defeat.  Leftists assume that 
our lack of good ideas means the end of the political.  If the game isn’t played on our terms, we 
aren’t going to play at all.  We aren’t even going to recognize that a game is being played.  To 
this extent, the claim for post-politics erases its own standpoint of enunciation. Why refer to a 
formation as post-political if one does not have political grounds for doing so? If one already has 
such grounds, then how exactly is the situation post-political? If one lacks them, then what is the 
purpose of the claim if not to draw attention to or figure this lack for the sake of political 
struggle?         
 Given the successes of the right, moreover, the claim that we live in a post-political time 
doesn’t ring true. In the United States, the right has worked actively to reframe the constitution 
according to a theory of the unitary executive, to reverse the steps taken toward racial equality by 
undercutting Brown v. the Board of Education, to facilitate the redistribution of wealth to the top 
one percent of the population, to undermine the Geneva conventions as well as habeas corpus, to 
empower unwarranted state surveillance of the population, and to install a narrow, extreme, 
version of fundamentalist Christian doctrine into scientific discussions of evolution and climate 
change so as to disable any supposition of a common world or reality for which we might share 
responsibility. These are political achievements. To emphasize post-politics prevents us from 
understanding them as such.  
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 Far from affirming the identity of the people with itself, as Ranciere argues, 
contemporary polls  reveal a fundamental split, a fundamental uncertainty, and the excess of 
politics over attempts to identify the people with “the calculations of a science of the 
population’s opinions” (Disagreement, 105). Since the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, 
ultimately decide by the U.S. Supreme Court, conventional wisdom has affirmed a divide 
between red and blue states. Polls reveal this split.  They express not indecision or variance 
among groups understood as parts of a whole but instead a fundamental division.  Former 
President Bill Clinton’s quip following the election to the effect that “the people have spoken; 
we just don’t know what they said” is thus misleading. What was clearly spoken was the division 
in the country.  Likewise, polls taken daily, even hourly, during the long U.S. presidential 
campaign of 2008 differ from each other; consumers of political news ingest numbers that differ 
from each other, call each other into doubt, and render the very categories of polling unstable. 
The gap between polls and electoral outcomes, the failure of exit polls accurately to predict the 
votes tallied (an issue in both the 2000 and the 2004 elections), and the politicization of this gap 
as corruption, crime, theft, and the racist disenfranchisement of African-American voters express 
a politics irreducible to the “postdemocratic metapolitics” Ranciere associates with the triumph 
of consensus. 
 While it may well have been a compelling account of France in the nineteen nineties, 
Ranciere’s version of post-politics is inapplicable to the United States post 9/11.  From the 
present vantage point, Ranciere’s critique of the spread of law as a primary form of 
depoliticization appears as a neoliberal argument against governmental oversight and for 
privatization.  Not only does it fail to acknowledge the collapse of regulation in the financial 
sector, but it also occludes forms of public/private partnership, the rise of private security forces, 
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and contemporary practices of surveillance wherein state agencies rely on private databases.  
Ranciere’s dismissal of law, administration, and expertise thus cannot serve as a basis for a 
critique of the neoliberal state’s abolition of oversight and neglect of basic governance.  I should 
add that it is also incompatible with the acknowledgement of the widespread skepticism toward 
science and expertise and the concomitant cultivation and embrace of amateur, ordinary, and 
common opinion, a phenomenon Zizek associates with a general decline in symbolic efficiency 
(1999, 322). Over the last decade, the United States has witnessed the supplanting of expert 
knowledge by gut instinct, by religious faith, by capacities to know simply by seeing or feeling, 
and by the rejection of detail and complexity as elitist, unnecessary, and unwarranted. In this 
setting, techno-legal regulation and administration would be an improvement. 
 Nonetheless, there are two ways that post-politics is a useful descriptor.  Post-politics 
names a specific problem in left political theory: the fantasy of a politics without politics. Such a 
fantasy animates Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s multitude as well as Giorgio Agamben’s 
coming community. It appears as well in the U.S. left’s embrace of new social movements and 
identity politics. Understood in terms of the fantasy of a politics without politics, the problem of 
post-politics then becomes not one of governance, not one of consensus politics and opinion 
polls, but rather one linked to the left embrace of identity as the primary term and terrain of 
political struggle. In accepting an empirical account of identities (an acceptance we can date to 
the nineteen eighties and nineties), left endeavors toward inclusion and recognition ended up 
naturalizing rather than politicizing markers of identity. We treated identities as sociological 
rather than political categories and hence as unable to figure universal claims.  For example, a 
term like “people of color” fails to function as a universal but designates instead exclusion from 
the category “white.” It works sociologically as an empirical description rather than politically as 
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a claim to universality. To be clear, this failure of identity categories to function politically is not 
always and everywhere the case. It is not a necessary outcome of identity politics.  Nonetheless, 
it is widespread and it works against the building and invigorating of a contemporary left. 
 A second way the concept of post-politics can be useful is as an accentuation of the 
depoliticization of democracy. In the current conjuncture, to argue for democracy is to argue for 
more of the same. It is vehemently to demand what is already present, accepted, agreed on. To 
appeal to democracy is to appeal to the process in place. To this extent, democracy does not 
establish another stage (to use Ranciere’s formulation for disrupting a particular regime of 
appearance).  It does not open onto the universal or mobilize a segment of society as society. 
Such mobilization was possible when democracy named an opposition, whether to oligarchy or 
absolutism or fascism or colonialism.  In these instances, to stand for democracy was to stand 
against another order constituted against democracy. These days, though, when right and left 
agree on democracy, when democracy is the underlying supposition, when it provides the basic 
vocabulary of law and politics, to emphasize democracy is simply to invoke our “ambient 
milieu,” to try to have politics without politics. 
 Before proceeding, I should acknowledge my uncertainty regarding my lack of 
confidence in democracy. Perhaps my doubts stem from the wrong concept of democracy. Or 
perhaps they oscillate between concepts, ultimately relying on no concept whatsoever. There are 
at least three sites a theory of democracy might designate: 
 a. democracy might designate a site of resistance, struggle or opposition; 
 b. democracy might designate a system of governance, order, or rule; 
 c. democracy might designate a society, culture, or spirit (ambient milieu). 
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Which of these three is correct? Derrideans would say the fourth one: democracy is always to 
come and hence necessarily exceeds the three aforementioned sites. But this answer is just 
another version of “I know but nevertheless.”  Democracy remains an ideological fantasy 
covering the failures, excesses, and obscenities of real existing democracy. The Derridean 
response thus returns me back to where I started: democracy as the solution to the problems of 
democracy or the democratic capture of left aspirations to equitable and sustainable distributions 
of resources, labor, and its products.   
Derridean democracy to come and the post-politics, post-democracy thesis are two sides 
of the same coin. They are two aspects of democratic time, past and or future, but not now (Zizek 
might say that their relation is that of a parallax; we can see democracy from each perspective 
but not from the two perspectives simultaneously). Consider a chant repeated at hundreds and 
thousands of protests over the last decade: What do we want? Democracy! When do we want it? 
Now!  This chant works as a protest because it is clearly impossible. What would happen if the 
response were “Okay, protestors, you’ve got your democracy.  Now what are you going to do?” 
Imagine the executive branch of the U.S. government walking off the job, handing their codes 
and files and top-secret stamps to the throngs outside their gates, the protestors wondering what 
to do with their puppets, signs, and bongos as they fragment into affinity groups and try to decide 
what their goals and priorities are. The protestors are not really demanding democracy now. 
Their demand is not meant to be met.3    
Democracy has already arrived—as language of right and left, governance and electoral 
politics, ambient milieu.  This is what democracy looks like, real existing democracy. To avoid 
the trauma of the real, of getting what we wished for, leftists move from actuality to possibility 
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(from what we have to what could be), a move, incidentally, perpetually denied socialist critics 
of real existing socialism.  
But this move from actual to possible democracy doesn’t quite work. It misses its own 
movement or moving, the torsion that the shift from actual to possible entails.  Zizek’s 
description of the temporal anamorphosis (distortion) of objet petit a is appropriate here:   
Spatially, a is an object whose proper contours are discernible only if we glimpse 
it askance; it is forever indiscernible to the straightforward look.  Temporally, it is 
an object which exists only qua anticipated or lost, only in the modality of not-yet 
or not-anymore, never in the ‘now’ of a pure, undivided present (1993, 156).   
This description applies to democracy. Democracy is anticipated or lost, but never present. When 
one looks at the present, all one sees is a gap, perhaps manifested by multiple attempts to fill it, 
as in the various definitions of democracy as resistance, governance, or ambient milieu. There 
can be past democratic ideals—nostalgic fantasies of Athens, town meetings, our days in the 
resistance—or there can be hope for the future, justification of present acts in terms of this 
future, but there isn’t responsibility now. So disavowing democracy’s arrival, democracy now, 
contemporary left fantasies of democracy animate its diagnoses of post-politics and inspire its 
rejections of law, regulation, and the state. 
In the account I’ve offered thus far, democracy appears as an obscure object-cause of 
desire, something that can never be fully attained or reached without ending the desire for it. But 
this is only one aspect of objet a. The other is its status in drive, not as something lost but as a 
hole or gap, not as an impossible lost object but as loss itself.  Drawing from Lacan, Zizek 
construes drive as fixation, not as the thing onto which one is fixated (2006, 62).  In drive, 
enjoyment comes from missing one’s goal, from the repeated yet ever failing efforts to reach it 
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that start to become satisfying on their own. Drive circulates around an object, generating 
satisfaction through this very circulation. Perhaps paradoxically, then, drive is at the same time 
disruptive. Fixation cuts into and derails the regular course of things, what is taken for the 
conventional patterns of everyday life, assessments of benefit and risk, pragmatic realism, and 
the organic attempts to secure the conditions of life. It’s a traumatic kernel in the reality of the 
symbolic order itself.  
This drive dimension better describes democracy for the left; it is our circling around, our 
missing of a goal, and the satisfaction we attain through this missing. It accounts for the 
attachments and repetitions to which we are stuck, even as this very stuckness undermines our 
possibilities for political efficacy. Democratic drive, then, is another way of conceiving 
democracy as ambient milieu, a way that highlights the circulation we can’t avoid, but which at 
the same time can’t be understood as giving us what we want even as it gives us something else 
instead, some kick of enjoyment. We protest. We talk. We complain. We undercut our every 
assertion, criticizing its exclusivity, partiality, and fallibility in advance as if some kind of purity 
were possible, as if we could avoid getting our hands dirty. We sign petitions and forward them 
to everyone in our mailbox, fetishizing communication technologies as the solution to our 
problems. We worry about conservatives even as we revel in our superiority—how can anyone 
be so stupid? We enjoy. 
If drive involves circling around and fixating on a loss, hole, or gap, how should the hole 
around which democracy circulates be understood? For it is neither the empty place of power, 
nor a missing and impossible unity, nor a master signifier ready to be articulated into a signifying 
chain, conceptions that all rely on a logic of desire.  In Disagreement, Ranciere considers the 
beginnings of politics in terms of “an original twist that short-circuits the natural logic of 
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‘properties’” (13).  This twist, torsion, or interrupted current, he argues, is the wrong of a 
fundamental dispute that causes politics to occur. The smooth space of the natural order 
confronts a gap or hole. So there is not a natural order but a twisted one. There is a not a smooth 
flow or set of natural relations and identities; there is a hole distorting the whole, belying the 
fiction or fantasy of the whole thing or order.   
The hole of this original torsion is a missing conjunction, a missing link between people 
and government that political theory tries at best to express and at worst to occlude (government 
of the people, by the people, for the people, over the people). The torsion of politics means that 
the people and the government are not present at the same time (even Rousseau had to gloss his 
fantasy of the unrepresentable sovereignty of the people with a nod to Corsica).  Where the 
people are present, there is chaos, disruption.  Where government is present, then the people are 
not. Insofar as the people can never be fully present—some don’t show up, didn’t hear what was 
going on, were mislead by a powerful speaker, were miscounted from the outset—their 
necessary absence is the gap of politics.  
The torsion of wrong, Ranciere adds, makes each class different from itself 
(Disagreement, 18).  A class doesn’t simply persist doing its part in a larger complete whole. 
Political groups such as classes are not functional components of a prior order, an assumption as 
depoliticizing as it is foundational to political theory.  Insofar as they are split within the whole 
and within themselves, the many cannot be politically.  Polls try to make them appear through a 
count, which is always a kind of miscount and distortion.  The many, though, is only political 
through and as one, few, or some: one represents us to ourselves as many; few make possible and 
organize, provide themes and ideas; some do all the work (business types present this as the 
80/20 rule). The people are always non-all, not simply because the many is open and incomplete 
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but because it cannot totalize itself.  The rule of a leader, party, or even the law compensates for 
or occupies the hole of the missing conjunction between people and government (Zizek 2002, pp. 
187-189).  
Hence Ranciere in Disagreement separates political activity into two parts, two opposed 
yet entangled logics of politics and the police (28). We might think of these two parts as a 
division between legitimacy and order; each has what the other needs and/or wants, something 
that remains inaccessible, out of reach, something that would destruct if attained. To split politics 
into itself and the police is a way of saying there is no pure politics; there is more than upheaval; 
there is rule and ruling requires limits. In Ranciere’s terms “politics acts on the police” (33). 
Zizek adds the insight that cutting through both aspects of politics is the difference 
between rule and its obscene supplement, the difference between the letter of the law and the 
shadowy, nightly law on which it rests (1999, pp. 234-235).  We invoke this obscene dimension 
when we speak of dirty politics, dirty tricks, and dirty cops, of those who are willing to get their 
hands dirty.  Zizek refers to the famous line from Saint-Just: “nobody can rule innocently” 
(1993, p. 221). This is another way of saying that there is no pure politics, no innocent position. 
Politics’ primal scene, as it were, is its confrontation with compromise, failure, exclusion, the 
means necessary to get things done.  
Different discursive formations provide the fantasies occluding (and securing) this 
obscene fact. The master’s version: there is one who can rule innocently. Fantasies of the master 
forever seek to find this One. The democratic response replaces the one with all (as if such an all 
were possible without its constitutive exclusion): everybody can rule innocently. The perverse 
response: I’m willing to make myself into an instrument of the dirty work. Ranciere has yet 
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another response. He fully accepts that there is no innocent position (this is his notion of the 
police) but adds that this not a problem because anybody can rule.   
That anybody, anybody at all, can rule is, for Ranciere, the scandal of democracy. 
Democracy is the scandalous actuality of the contingency of the political. Via Zizek, I 
understand “contingent” to describe something that cannot be wholly grounded in its conditions 
of possibility (1993, 157). That which is contingent is possible; it could have been otherwise. 
Possibility, though, is not the same as contingency: what happens contingently could have not 
happened although it did. But why does Ranciere associate contingency with democracy?  Why 
is democracy another word for the contingency of the political? In the remainder of this paper, I 
take up this question of contingency, focusing on changes in Ranciere’s discussions of politics 
and equality from On the Shores of Politics to Disagreement. My interest here is in the way 
Ranciere’s arguments provide insight into the failure of democracy as a political form. Politics 
exceeds its narrative capture in and as democracy. As he attempts to equate politics and 
democracy, Ranciere brings to expression the deadlock of democratic drive. 
 
II. 
I’ve presented post-politics and democracy-to-come as two sides of the same coin. I’ve 
suggested that the gap separating and connecting them be thought in terms of the closed circuit 
of drive rather than the openness of desire. So understood, democracy is not what we seek but 
never reach, not a name for political desire as such, but instead a term for the capture of political 
aspiration in the circuit of drive. Democracy is a remnant from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries we have yet to escape. Differently put, if democracy names a political desire that is 
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never fulfilled, then it is accompanied by a political drive wherein democracy is what we fail to 
escape. In this dimension of drive, democracy designates our political stuckness.  
 In On the Shores of Politics, Ranciere presents politics as the depoliticizing response to 
democracy and equality as the counterfactual supposition to be repeatedly inscribed in and on the 
community. There is politics, he argues, because there is democracy. Politics responds to 
democracy. Understanding why requires the introduction of the notion of equality. Ranciere 
construes equality in terms of the creation of a space of appearance: “the egalitarian polemic 
invents an insubstantial community completely determined by the contingency and resolve of its 
enactment” (87). In the setting of material hierarchy, of a factual inequality wherein the few have 
much and the many have little, a claim to equality is spoken; it is contingently and forcibly 
introduced into the setting.  Equality is posited and with it the demand that inequality be 
explained. This egalitarian polemic enables the people to appear, not as an actually existing 
empirical group but as a supposition of reason and community.  It contrasts with the facts of 
actual inequality and produces a shared rationality by effecting a division between how things 
appear and how they can be made, forcibly, to appear. The postulation of a shared meaning, 
Ranciere argues, “assumes a symbolic violence both in respect of the other and in respect of 
oneself” (49). Politics results from this specifically democratic mobilization of appearance. It 
responds to the inscription of equality into facticity by trying to suppress it.  
In Disagreement, Ranciere changes this formulation of politics as a depoliticizing 
response to equality as he focuses on the confrontation equality stages. The opposition between 
democracy and politics becomes an opposition between politics (understood as democratic) and 
the police. Politics is no longer the force of depoliticization; rather, it is an activity antagonistic 
to policing (the other side of the antagonism constitutive of the political).   
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 I read the opposition Ranciere introduces in Disagreement as internal to the political, as a 
division within politics between two perspectives linked by the gap between them (a parallax gap 
wherein the same object appears slightly different when looked at from the perspective of each 
division). Politics, then, is the manifestation of this gap or division.  Examples of the division 
between politics and the police in the history of political thought appear as divisions between 
legislation and execution, between constituent and constituted power, and between the people as 
sovereign and as subject. In Ranciere’s version, politics occurs in the meet-up between two 
heterogeneous processes—the process of the police and the process of equality. The police is “an 
order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying 
… it is an order of the visible and the sayable” (29). Ranciere uses the term politics to designate 
“whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are 
defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration—that of the 
part of those who have no part” (29-30).   
Each aspect of political activity, politics and police, makes something appear. Politics—
through the egalitarian inscription—disorders appearance, making something appear different 
from the way it appeared before.  As an ordering or arranging, a counting, an assigning of place, 
the police, too, makes something appear differently. The clash of politics in the gap and 
confrontation of two heterogeneous logics, then, is a clash not between how things are in reality 
or between reality and appearance, but in their modes of appearance or representation.  
 The part of no part thus does not designate the objectivity of an empirical group excluded 
from the political domain.  It’s not another way of referring to a politics of identity by locating a 
marginalized other. For Ranciere, political subjectification is not political identification, rather it 
is the inscription of a name, a disidentification and the registration of a gap (Disagreement, 36). 
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He explains that there are “political modes of subjectification only in the set or relationships that 
the we and the name maintain with the set of ‘persons,’ the concrete play of identities and 
alterities implicated in the demonstration and the worlds—common or separate—where these are 
defined” (59). Political subjectification stages polemical scenes, paradoxical scenes that bring 
out the contradiction between two logics.  Indeed, it stages the very contradiction between police 
logic and political logic (41). This contradiction is thus internal to politics; it is politics.  
Accordingly, it makes most sense to think of the part that is not a part as precisely such a gap: a 
gap in the existing order of appearance between that order and other possible arrangements, the 
space between and within worlds. The Lacanian term for the part of no part would then be objet 
petit a, an impossible, formal object produced as the excess of a process or relation, a kind of gap 
that incites or annoys, the missingness or not-quite-rightness that calls out to us. 
 A benefit of considering the part of no part as objet a is its accentuation of the fact that 
this part is not a substantial part, not an empirical designator such that exclusion is the exclusion 
of people and their inclusion necessarily a political good. For example, religious fundamentalist 
might be a name of the part with no part in a liberal order. To include that part would distort and 
disrupt the order predicated on the exclusion of fundamentalist religion.  Moreover, if one views 
the contemporary political terrain as a global one, as constituted through the elimination or 
subsumption of an outside (Hardt and Negri’s view), then understanding the part of no part as 
objet a can enable the theorization of the holes and gaps constitutive of the shape this global 
terrain takes.  Finally, to treat the part of no part as objet a brings out the fact that the democratic 
narrativization of the gap or torsion of politics is but one possible narration. There are others, 
others that might and should be rejected or accepted but that will continue to incite, annoy, 
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thwart, and produce us.  Acknowledging these torsions will not make them go away. But it might 
enable us better to comprehend and tactically address ways that we enjoy being politically stuck. 
 I’ve argued that the part of no part be understood as objet a and that the division between 
politics and the police be read as an internal division within politics.  If this division is not 
internal to politics, then Ranciere’s position falls into a kind of hysterical pure politics of 
resistance (cf. Zizek’s critique in The Ticklish Subject).  Much of his discussion in Disagreement 
suggests such a pure politics, particularly insofar as Ranciere insists that politics is essentially 
democratic and that it is democratic because it consists in the confrontation between the police 
logic and egalitarian logic.  For example, he views politics has happening “very little or rarely,” 
only when the mechanisms of majesty and management are “stopped in their tracks by the effect 
of a presupposition that is totally foreign to them yet without which none of them could 
ultimately function: the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone, or the 
paradoxical effectiveness of the sheer contingency of any order” (17). I turn, then, to Ranciere’s 
account of equality and its association with contingency.  
 As I have already mentioned, in On the Shores of Politics, the inscription of the 
egalitarian signifier into a factual situation makes the “community of equals appear as the 
ultimate underpinning of the distribution of institutions and obligations” (91). The declaration of 
equality makes the artifice of power visible as such. It makes a given arrangement of power 
appear as contingent, unnecessary, as something that has been created and could be otherwise.  
Disagreement develops this contingent dimension of equality such that equality means the sheer 
contingency of social order. Ranciere describes the empty freedom the Athenians presented to 
philosophy as “the equality of anyone at all with anyone else: in other words, in the final 
analysis, the absence of arkhe, the sheer contingency of any social order” (15). What is given 
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isn’t necessary; it didn’t have to be this way. It could have been otherwise. Politics occurs when 
a given order of the police (or partition of the perceptible) is confronted with its own 
contingency.  
 Ranciere’s emphasis on contingency is not convincing on its own (without an 
accompanying discussion of possibility and necessity). It’s more akin to a fantasy.  Like 
Cinderella, I could really be a princess! I coulda been a contender, a rock star. I still could! 
Zizek argues that fantasy, “in its most basic dimension, implies the choice of thought at the 
expense of being: in fantasy I find myself reduced to the evanescent point of a thought 
contemplating the course of events during my absence,” (1993, p. 64). What Ranciere presents as 
contingency is a fantasy that holds out the possibility of “anything at all” as a way of 
accommodating a situation without confronting the reality of the constraints in producing it, the 
determinations of socio-economic systems and practices.  Such a fantasy is ultimately a fantasy 
of my own non-existence in the situation I confront, as if somehow I was outside of and apart 
from the situation’s determinations.  Leaving aside the historical question of whether democracy 
in Athens really meant that anyone could rule, anyone at all—the determinations of gender and 
slavery suggest otherwise—a reading of politics as rooted only in its own contingency is too 
close to a state of nature or view from nowhere to be useful for thinking through the challenges 
of contemporary politics.  What possibilities does a given actualization abandon or even 
foreclose? Simply to say that such an actualization was contingent rather than necessary neglects 
this question and obscures the persistence of necessity under the fantasy of what could have 
happened.  
 The claim that the situation could have been different fails to provide leverage toward 
making the situation different.  Few today argue that our arrangements and institutions are 
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natural or inevitable.  For example, social conservatives in the United States readily accept that 
the family is a social construct and a fragile one at that. Hence, they offer policies designed to 
shore up a specific patriarchal vision of the nuclear family. They don’t think sexual identity is 
fixed; thus, they sponsor programs that try to make gay people straight.  When democracy is our 
ambient milieu, contingency’s revelation of artifice, of the fact that things might be otherwise, 
loses any efficacy it might have had in setting where order was justified as natural. 
 More troubling, though, is Ranciere’s rendering of contingency specifically as equality.  
Ranciere’s idea is that insofar as the political order is not given by nature, not determined, it rests 
on an underlying contingency; its foundation is its lack of foundation (Disagreement, 16).  
Politics occurs as an interruption, the interruption of a freedom that “makes real the ultimate 
equality on which society rests” (16).  The question, then, is the status of this equality. A 
foundation in equality is not the same as the contingency of inequality; underlying a contingent 
inequality could well be multiple contingent inequalities or the possibility of equality.  Ranciere 
seems to be saying that something about equality is Real, more than an inscription and the 
production of a common space of disagreement.  He suggests, in order words, that equality is not 
only an aspect of the symbolic order but also a distorting of or gap within that order.  When 
equality appears it appears within the order of the police.  Politics forces it to appear and so 
changes this order, but the appearing remains within the order of the police.  The order of the 
police is a condition for equality’s appearance. 
 Ranciere describes the equality he has in mind as that of any speaking being with any 
other speaking being. The logic of equality, he says, is a logic that dispels the count and 
distribution of the order of the police; it “disrupts this harmony through the mere fact of 
achieving the contingency of the equality, neither arithmetical or geometric, of any speaking 
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being whatsoever” (Disagreement, 28). Not surprisingly given this supposition of 
communicative competence on the part of speaking beings, Ranciere considers the necessary 
suppositions of understanding in language.  His account differs from Habermas’s primarily on 
the matter of consensus (Disagreement has an extended critique of Habermas on a number of 
grounds including Habermas’s distinction between poetic and argumentative language, his shift 
away from a third person perspective, and his account of performative contradiction).  For 
Habermas the supposition of understanding means that we have to suppose an orientation to 
agreement. Ranciere disagrees. He argues that understanding is rooted in a supposition of 
equality and this supposition leads to disagreement. 
 Consider a command. To follow a command, the commanded must comprehend what the 
command is and understand that the command is meant to be followed or observed.  The 
implication of this supposition of understanding, Ranciere tells us, is that even hierarchy is 
premised on an underlying equality.  He writes: “equality is an assumption that another 
understands what I’m saying” (Disagreement, 33).  In the setting of what Zizek tags the decline 
of symbolic efficiency, this assumption of understanding is rather far-fetched.  Our present 
political-medialogical setting is one of dissensus, incredulity, and competing conceptions of 
reality.  Most of the time it seems like no one understands much of anything anyone says. As 
Žižek points out, Donald Davidson designates the background assumption that everything 
another says is not completely wrong the “principle of charity.” It’s a presumption of underlying 
agreement on which disagreement rests.  Davidson argues that “charity is not an option…charity 
is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them 
right in most matters” (cited in Zizek 2000, p. 114).  The decline of symbolic efficiency points to 
the withering away of this principle of charity: less and less are people today forced to presume 
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charity or understanding. There are strong material-technological explanations for this withering 
away.  Not only are communication technologies charitable in our stead, making connections 
with other machines, but the interconnecting of ever more people lets us find enough of those 
who share our convictions that we don’t have to believe.  In fact, we can imagine a contemporary 
post-linguistic argument to the effect that equality is the assumption that nobody understands 
what anyone else is saying, an assumption of shared incomprehension (but an incomprehension 
that connects nonetheless), a kind of incommensurability that morphs into its opposite. Insofar as 
equality can be just as easily viewed in terms of incomprehension as it can be viewed as a 
supposition of understanding or principle of charity, Ranciere’s argument for equality is 
unconvincing. 
 Nonetheless, what is important for Ranciere is the equality that underpins understanding. 
He explains: 
To say that there is a common speech situation because an inferior understands 
what a superior is saying means that a disagreement, a provisional confrontation 
must be set up between two camps: those for whom there is an understanding 
within understanding, that is, that all speaking beings are equal speaking beings, 
and those who do not think so. The paradox is that those who think there is an 
understanding within understanding are for that very reason unable to take this 
deduction any further except in the form of a disagreement, since they are bound 
to show a result that is not at all apparent (Disagreement, 49). 
Ranciere’s argument is a nice twist on the idea of performative contradiction (and I have in mind 
here Habermas’s use of this idea). Typically, the idea of a performative contradiction emphasizes 
an incompatibility between the content of an utterance and the conditions that make its uttering 
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possible (Lacan discusses this as a difference between the enunciation and the enunciated). In 
introducing the performative contradiction, one forces the speaker to consider what she has to 
assume not just to make her point but to speak at all. Ranciere’s version of this idea employs a 
response to the claim of performative contradiction that says, “So what? I still disagree,” (a 
response that drives Habermasians crazy).  He highlights the side of the one accused of 
contradicting herself (her conditions of speech), attributing to her an obstinacy or resistance in 
the face of full awareness of contradiction. This obstinacy, moreover, is what sets politics in 
motion. The stand-off makes politics necessary.   
 More specifically, then, Ranciere takes the fact of understanding and says that from this 
fact one can assume that speaking beings are equal or one can assume that speaking beings are 
unequal. Those who insist that speaking beings are equal cannot rely on logic or reason to 
persuade their opponent (who doesn’t accept them as equal). But their insistence can nonetheless 
stage the disagreement between them and their opponent; it can make the division between them 
appear.  The one who asserts that understanding means that speaking beings are equal has to 
prove what is not apparent.  He has to demonstrate what does not appear to be the case.  He has 
to make equality appear in a setting of apparent inequality. The stage of political conflict, then, is 
constituted through positing an equality of speaking beings in a setting of inequality, through 
making this common stage appear via disagreement.  Ranciere’s example is the worker who 
proceeds counterfactually as if there were a shared world of argument, even though there is not 
one, even though the owner of capital does not recognize or does not want to recognize this 
common world.  
 So politics appears through the disagreement of speaking beings, through a clash or gap 
produced in the encounter between their worlds and their words, a clash Ranciere describes as a 
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staging of the contradiction between the egalitarian logic and the logic of the police. The 
assertion of egalitarian logic is contingent; one might assert equality or one might not. But here’s 
the rub: disagreement is what makes the stage of political conflict appear. Equality is one 
contingent vehicle for disagreement. Equality can serve as such a vehicle because it is counter to 
the conditions in which it is claimed (hierarchical conditions); hierarchy, however, is only one 
potentially politicizable condition of a given participation of the perceptible. The Real attached 
to equality, then, is the gap, missingness, or not-quite-rightness that the claim to equality makes 
apparent; it’s the Real of a disjuncture. More precisely, objet a attaches to equality as the gaze 
that perceives the gap effected by the distortion of the Real (cf. Zizek 1993, p. 66). 
 Ranciere’s emphasis is on the disgreement between those who claim the equality of 
speaking beings and those who deny it. Such disagreement is not essential to equality but can be 
made to appear through other counter-factual claims. We can imagine the inscription of liberty as 
a claim to freedom in conditions of unfreedom; or the converse: a claim of unfreedom in 
conditions of freedom. One says an unfettered market in commodities is freedom. The other 
responds: I disagree. We can imagine the inscription of ownership in the commons, a claim to 
private property in conditions of common goods. One says: this is mine. The other responds: I 
disagree. And we can imagine claims of belonging in conditions of fear and exclusion. The one 
says: I am one of you. The other says: I disagree. Each of these instances of liberty, ownership, 
and belonging stages a conflict within a given partition of the perceptible and attempts to make 
an alternative partition appear. But none is the same as the egalitarian inscription and none is 
strictly speaking democratic. There are non-democratic stagings of disagreement. And because 
there are non-democratic stagings, politics is not necessarily democratic. 
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 In fact, more problematic than Ranciere’s reduction of politics to the clash between the 
egalitarian logic and the logic of the police is a further entanglement that the instances of liberty, 
ownership, and belonging highlight, namely, the implication that the police is necessarily counter 
to democracy and democracy necessarily counter to the police.  The order of the police may well 
involve a rule of law that seeks to preserve and protect certain liberties, common or public 
spaces, and practices of belonging. Contesting this order can involve taking the position of the 
part of no part and making the violence and contingency of the order’s partition of the 
perceptible appear.  Insofar as such contestation is contingent, its effects are neither necessary 
nor necessarily democratic.  Again, we might think here of instances of a fundamentalist 
(whether religious, ethnic, or market) rejection of its democratic foreclosure; the fundamentalist 
occupies the place of what a democratic partitioning must exclude and makes this exclusion 
appear in its contingency and violence.  
 If the dominant order presents itself as democratic, if the order of the police is the order 
of democracy, then only non-democratic stagings of disagreement can be political since only 
they set up a contrast with the conditions of their utterance. Far from exclusively democratic, 
politics can be fascist, anarchist, imperial, communist.  Such stagings are holes, gaps, torsions in 
the contemporary setting, sites that annoy and excite.  Ranciere narrativizes the introduction of 
gaps as necessarily democratic and laments the contemporary post-political conditions of 
impossibility for their emergence. My argument is that gaps emerge; they are political, and 
contemporary democracy organizes enjoyment as an effect of circling around these gaps. 
Ranciere’s narrativization, then, is better understood an image of the capture of politics in the 
circuits of democratic drive. The contemporary setting is not one of simple opposition between 
post-political consensus and the eruption of irrational violence (and eruption Ranciere views as a 
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return of the archaic). Rather, it involves the satisfaction of the democratic drive as its aims 
remain inhibited.  
 A consideration of the gaze may help clarify my idea here. Ranciere emphasizes the way 
the disagreement over the equality of speaking beings stages a conflict and enables the 
appearance of the contingency of the prior partition of the perceptible.  Disagreement depends on 
a prior thwarting of the aim, equality. Rather than achieving the goal of equality, then, 
disagreement produces satisfaction, I’ll call it a political satisfaction, by staging the lack of 
equality. Although it might seem paradoxical that one’s aim is not agreement to one’s demand—
the demand for equality—the paradox occurs only in the register of desire. Understood in terms 
of drive, the bending or distortion or change in the aim such that the failure to reach it provides 
enjoyment makes sense. The aim of equality is sublimated in the drive to make one’s 
disagreement with inequality appear. One gets satisfaction by appearing in one’s disagreement. 
This provides its own partial enjoyment and in fact can only continue to provide it so long as 
there is inequality, so long as the ostensible aim in staging the disagreement isn’t reached. 
 Ranciere’s account of the staging of disagreement, rather than figuring the political as 
such (the political confrontation between politics and the police) exemplifies the sublimation of 
politics in democratic drive. As drive, democracy organizes enjoyment via a multiplicity of 
stagings, of making oneself visible in one’s lack. Contemporary protests in the United States, 
whether as marches, vigils, Facebook pages, or internet petitions aim at visibility, awareness, 
being seen. They don’t aim at taking power. Our politics is one of endless attempts to make 
ourselves seen.  It’s as if instead of looking at our opponents and working out ways to defeat 
them, we get off on imagining them looking at us.  And since, as Lacan reminds us in Seminar 
XI, the object of the drive is of total indifference (1998, p. 168), the disagreement one imagines 
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oneself being seen as staging is irrelevant.  Egalitarian or elite, anarchist or communist, any 
political gap will provide a charge sublimated as it is within the democratic drive. We want to 
make ourselves seen as political without actually taking the risk of politics.  
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1 Hence the signifying importance of the Holocaust as the exception, the one undeniable 
thing that must be clearly condemned. Of course, even this seemingly clear instance of “that 
which must be condemned” can be and is increasingly becoming cloudy as with movements 
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toward acknowledging the suffering of the German people during the war or in Hollywood films 
that consider the “good Nazis.” 
2. George Lakoff, “Much More Than Race: What Makes a Speech Great,” posted to Open 
Left on March 24, 2008. Available at http://www.openleft.com/showDiary.do?diaryId=4751. 
3. A reader on my blog counter with the claim that “this is what democracy looks like” is a 
more common protest chant. He argues that this is an assertion of a present democracy as 
disruption. I disagree. In the U.S. protests are not disruptive in the least. They are occasions for 
families to march together, for vendors to supply t-shirts and bumper stickers, for cops to 
photograph activist groups. They are licit and momentary, guarantees and supports of the system 
they ostensibly contest. 
 
